Under "tenure review," the ongoing privatization of South Island Crown pastoral leases, a pastoral lessee surrenders part of his leasehold, and acquires a freehold interest in the remainder. In order to determine whether the Crown sold the right to freehold too cheaply, we model the proportional difference between the price (per hectare) at which the Crown sold its interest to the lessee, and the prices paid to former lessees who have onsold some part of their new freeholds.
Background.
About 20% of the South Island of New Zealand consists of Crown land leased to pastoral farmers. 1
The leases have 33 year terms and are renewable in perpetuity. Since 1992, a pastoral lessee can apply to acquire a freehold interest in part of his leaseholds, if he agrees to cede part of his leasehold to the Crown. The resulting land reform transaction is called "tenure review." Under tenure review, the Crown sells its residual ownership interest in the part of the leasehold 'capable of economic use,' 2 and buys the lessee's interest in the part deemed to have conservation value.
Bargaining in each tenure review deal includes the following features:
• The Crown hires a contractor to bargain on its behalf with the lessee;
• The contractor's compensation does not vary with the terms of the deal agreed to; • The contractor is compensated for completing tasks on a checklist, with the final payment made when the deal is closed;
• The Crown sets no reserve price on what it sells;
• Only the lessee may bid for freehold ownership.
Tenure review gives rise to two significant option values: 1) A lessee has the option to acquire a freehold interest in part of his leasehold by going through tenure review; 2) Like any freeholder, a new freeholder has the option to apply to subdivide or to vary the land use of his freehold.
The Crown employs a professional valuer to estimate the value of the Crown's residual interest in the land to be privatised. We used the Official Information Act 1982 to obtain copies of the resulting valuation reports. For all but four of the 77 deals, these valuation reports We evaluate this situation by comparing the price (per ha):
• At which the Crown sold its interest to the lessee;
• Received by a new freeholder who on-sells part of the freehold.
Hypothesis.
Controlling for location and the time value of money, the option to change land use post tenure review gives rise to rents enjoyed by former high country pastoral lessees.
Dependent variable.
os P = Price/ha obtained when new freeholder sells some part of his freehold. 
Explanatory Variables.
ln(size) = log of on-sold parcel size in hectares. A small to medium size parcel is indicative of a major departure from extensive pastoral land use; thus parcel size is our operational measure of land use change. Higher value uses (e.g., lifestyle blocks, viticulture, lake-front sections) are correlated with smaller parcels. Hence a small parcel will command a higher price per hectare than a large one, and we predict a negative coefficient.
Location = 1 if the leasehold lies within 10km of Queenstown or Wanaka, and/or within sight of Lakes Hawea, Pukaki, Tekapo, Wakatipu, or Wanaka; = 0 otherwise. These characteristics give rise to amenity values and hence higher market prices.
We predict a positive coefficient.
Time elapsed = Years elapsed between completion of tenure review and subsequent onsale. As this controls for the time value of money, we predict a positive coefficient with a value similar to
New Zealand dollar long-term interest rates.
Results.
The estimated regressions are reported in 2. The government agency in charge, LINZ, proposes to explain the price discrepancy as follows: a) An independent report (Armstrong et al. 2006) concluded that tenure-review prices were "fair" because both Crown and lessee agreed to all aspects of the deals. 4
b) The option value of subdivision was minimal when most tenure reviews were completed; c) LINZ relied on expert valuation advice to obtain f P ;
d) The problem is confined to deals concluded before 1998, when tenure review appraisals admittedly failed to take development potential into account.
(a) wrongly assumes that the only parties with an interest in tenure review outcomes are the Crown negotiating agent and the lessee. It assumes that the parties can reach an efficient agreement, regardless of parties external to the deal. But when one party is the Crown, the agreement affects parties not present at the negotiations. Thus the efficiency, Pareto optimality, and fairness of an agreement reached by insiders alone cannot be assumed. 5
(b), (c) and (d) assume that after 1998, valuers retained by the Crown took into account the option value of subdivision. In fact, valuers did so in only the four deals shown in Table 3 , and only one transaction in our data involved land carved out from one of those four deals. In the case of Alphaburn, the option to change land use was valued at $3M for the entire 3365ha privatized. Yet less than one year after privatization, Table 1 reveals that the new owner sold a mere 193ha for $10.1M. Furthermore, Table 3 shows that even when a valuer foresaw the subdivision potential, the price at which the Crown agreed to grant freehold was well below the valuer's estimate.
Conclusion.
The large discrepancies between os P and f P are consistent with former lessees' enjoying large rents after tenure review. This suggests tenure review is inefficient for at least three reasons:
a) The option to acquire large rents via tenure review could artificially inflate the sale price of leaseholds in course, making explanation 1(d) a selffulfilling prophecy (albeit one not supported by the data).
b) The price inflation of (a) makes tenure review an increasingly expensive policy. 
